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THE ARTS OF LIVING 
 
We are in the midst of paradigm change, brought on by 
initiatives like biological systems theory, post-structuralism, 
James Gibson’s theory of affordances,1 and neuroplasticity. 
Top-down or prime-mover models of change have given 
way to principles of creative interactivity and causal pari-
ty, in which concentrations of forces and systemic ele-
ments continue to play significant roles, but only as parts 
of turbulent, non-totalizable assemblages. The findings of 
the genome project have put genetic determinism in doubt. 
Today’s genes do not write the scripts of our lives; they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1979). 
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relatively passive elements in a complex field of biochem-
ical interactions. Jesper Hoffmeyer summarizes the situa-
tion this way: “Living cells . . . use DNA to construct the organ-
ism, not vice versa.”2 Many kinds of conjunctions and 
symbioses now appear to have significance for bio-
history; these are evolutionary events that depend neither 
on natural selection nor mutation. The study of multi-cell-
ularity shows that individuation and aggregation are both 
fundamental to living process, and are interdependent ra-
ther than mutually exclusive processes. Focus on the ac-
tions of cells has restored the importance of the life expe-
rience of the organism and its forms of relationality to 
evolutionary theory; bio-history is now seen to be created 
by mutually constitutive interactions between the geno-
type, the phenotype, and environmental, including social, 
affordances. The organism is no longer a “dead end,” and 
evolution turns out to be a history of ecologies rather than 
of anthropomorphized “selfish” genes bent on self-repli-
cation. Semiosis—communication—is a sine qua non of 
living process. The brain’s capacity for estimation and 
signal-interpretation is, simply, vital; only in very specific 
knowledge-ecologies does it require probability theory and 
experimental controls to act on behalf of sentient experi-
ence. Living process—including artful, real-time, improvi-
sational activity—finally plays a significant role in bio-
historiography. 
 Many forms of life enjoy meaning-making and inter-
preting; what Panksepp calls “SEEKING” is not, as some of 
our latter-day theorists would have it, a contemptible 
pleasure, but an aspect of living process.3 By “communi-
cation,” moreover, we do not intend simply “information-
processing” or “de/coding of lexical messages.” We honor 
the joy of utterance, the intersubjectivity it sponsors, and 
the affective-paraverbal features of language. As Bach-
elard once put it, “[b]eautiful words are already reme-
dies.”4 It is, of course, important that we do not idealize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Jesper Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009), 32. 
3 J. Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human 
and Animal Emotions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
24–27, 51. 
4 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie: Childhood, Language 
and the Cosmos, trans. Daniel Russell (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 
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the interconnectedness of living (as well as non-living) 
matter, or assume that discourses thereof cannot be ap-
propriated by powers inimical to creaturely enjoyment, 
like neoliberalism. But we can say that it is not possible to 
prosper all alone. Epidemiological studies show that poor 
health in the poorer ranks of a population predicts poorer 
health in its richer ranks as well. To speak of thriving, we 
know that lab rats grow bigger and stronger when their 
environments are “enriched”—that is to say, when they 
have lots of toys, meaningful activities, and opportunities 
to be curious and sociable. It is the same for us. As the 
evolutionary scientist J.Z. Young points out,5 art matters to life; 
organisms want to live only when life is worth living. The 
Darwinist A.R. Wallace wrote in 1891 that “the popular 
idea of the struggle for existence entailing misery and pain 
on the animal world is the very reverse of the truth.” What 
it seeks, and often finds, is the “maximum of life and of the 
enjoyment of life.”6 
 Too many humanists think of science scientistically, 
and accept, and even idealize, its epistemological privi-
lege, arguing, for example, that we should be doing sci-
ence, or something that looks like it. We should take field 
observation as a model of descriptive reserve, when (iron-
ically) explication de texte is currently being recommend-
ed as an important analytical method in the social scienc-
es. We should also jettison explication de texte—as many 
literary historians have argued at least since the 1970s—in 
favor of watermark studies or the computation of geographical 
distribution of literary genres. Digital humanists have long 
insisted that if the humanities are to become competitive 
again, we must valorize and practice what amounts to en-
gineering. By now, some of the results are in, and they are 
not impressive. In the English Department at the Univer-
sity of California, Santa Barbara, at least, where the digital 
humanities have been fostered (and rightly so) for two 
decades, the embrace thereof has not prevented the loss 
of office staff, significant FTE attrition, retention failure, 
and the like. We are told we must compete, but rhetoric 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31.  
5 J.Z. Young, An Introduction to the Study of Man (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1971). 
6 A.R. Wallace, Darwinism: A Exposition of the Theory of Natural 
Selection (London: Macmillan, 1891), 40 (http://www.gutenberg.org/ 
files/14558/14558-h/14558-h.htm). 
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about survival and competition belongs to an outdated 
understanding of evolution; the study of cooperation and 
mutual aid is now among the most vigorous sub-fields in 
evolutionary psychology and biology. Contemporary prac-
titioners of the biological sciences were trained during the 
heydays of poststructuralism, multiculturalism and envi-
ron-mental theory; recall that Gibson’s seminal work on 
affordances and the commingling of pro- and exterocep-
tion dates from the late 1970s. It is now de rigeur to recog-
nize that, in work with human subjects, “human” does not 
mean “white middle class North American” graduate stu-
dents; comparative psychology has gained enormously in 
importance since the days when scientists scorned multicul-
turalism as an attack on universals.  
 I hope that our interdisciplinary work will draw as 
much as possible, not on the exploded scientism of the 
past, but on the contemporary embrace of causal parity, 
plasticity, and real-time experimental ecologies. The hu-
manities teach the arts of living—how to see, interpret, 
express, hear, and feel as richly and widely as possible. 
And they teach us how to practice those arts in the context 
of real-time, improvisational activity—the kind of thing 
we do every day, all day long, the significance of which 
must be restored as against the habituation that tempts us 




Speaking of habituation, this is how Isabelle Stengers de-
scribes what she does as a university researcher: 
 
One way of articulating what I do is that my work is 
not addressed to my colleagues. This is not about 
contempt, but about learning to situate oneself in 
relation to a future—a future in which I am uncer-
tain as to what will have become of universities. . . . De-
fending them against external attacks (rankings, 
objective evaluation in all domains, the economy of 
knowledge) is not particularly compelling because 
of the passivity with which academics give in. This 
shows that it’s over. Obviously, the interesting 
question is: who is going to take over? At the end of 
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the era of the medieval university, it was not clear 
who would take over.7  
 
It was not clear. Things are not clear, or they are very clear. 
It ain’t over ‘till it’s over, or it’s already over. We’ve en-
tered an era of loving our catastrophes, of tuning them for 
scholarly fugues about the end of everything, where it’s no 
longer about preparing for the end or even surviving that 
end, but about living on the rising waves and pandemic 
fumes of its temporal drag, where we cultivate and adorn 
shipwrecks instead of gardens.8 
 Speaking of drag, history’s a real drag. It makes think-
ing hard, because you can’t get out of it. It’s always giving 
you headaches, especially if you work in a university of a 
certain Western-white-Anglo-German variety, which is al-
most all of them. There’s no remedy for this, no over-the-
library-counter medication. There’s a lot of alternative 
histories but we call those “minor,” they’re at the “bot-
tom,” and there’s never an alternative no-history. No blank 
pages. No Lucretian laminar void. The only thing to do in a 
laminar void is fall and bump into things, and that makes 
it the perfect setting for novelty and new relationalities—
in fact, for history. History without laminar voids is not 
history; it’s propaganda. Cruising is historical, or vice ver-
sa; we’re speaking also of Bersani’s “non-masochistic jouis-
sance (one that owes nothing to the death drive).”9 It means 
we get to have our jouissance without demands, without 
insisting that someone else pay a price for it. And maybe 
also without always over-thinking it. Because history is a 
drag.  
 That’s the tragedy of Meryl Streep as Susan Orlean in 
Charlie Kaufman’s Adaptation, standing up to her waist in 
the Everglades swamp after her lover, the orchid thief 
John LaRoche, is eaten by a crocodile: 
 
Oh my God. Everything’s over. I did everything wrong. I 
want my life back. I want it back before it got all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 “The Care of the Possible: Isabelle Stengers interviewed by Erik 
Bordeleau,” trans. Kelly Ladd, Scapegoat 1 (2011): 12 [12–27]. 
8 Steve Mentz, At the Bottom of Shakespeare’s Ocean (London: 
Continuum, 2009), 98.  
9  Leo Bersani, “Sociability and Cruising,” in Is the Rectum a 
Grave? And Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2010), 61 [45–62]. 
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fucked up. Let me be a baby again. I want to be new. I 
want to be new. 
 
That’s our tragedy, too. 
 Becoming-new (as opposed to, say, Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s becoming-intense, becoming-animal, becoming-
imperceptible, etc.10) feels practically impossible. We’ll 
admit that we can’t escape history, exactly, and that Epi-
curus’s laminar void—through which atomic particles 
once “rained,” and then, through various small “swerves” 
(Luctretius’s clinamen),11 created our world—is no longer 
possible (at least, not from the standpoint of the universe 
being empty). At the same time, we need not only to be 
able to account for novelty (isn’t that partly what critical 
studies of art, for example, are about? and also historical 
studies?), but to also be able to create it, and this can’t be 
accomplished without somehow charting returns to (or 
reboots of) that laminar void, in order to cultivate its radi-
cal contingency, its powers for engendering material en-
counters that can’t be predicted in advance, and out of 
which alternative life- and art-practices become possible.  
 Why does novelty matter? Because without it, every-
thing is always set to repeat, even with overtly subversive 
variations—Judith Butler’s thinking on drag as performa-
tive repetition “with a difference,” for example, where 
creative innovation is of course possible, but also always 
depends on iterations of the same and thus never entirely 
breaks free of its object of critique.12 As Aaron Bady has 
argued recently, with regard to the institutional unrest 
within the University of California, critique “is often not 
very good at breaking away from its object; critique is de-
pendent on its objects, and its objects will define the 
meaning and possibilities of critique.” Further, to critique 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “1730: Becoming-In-
tense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible . . .,” in A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
11 See David J. Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1967), and Lucretius, De Rerum 
Natura, ed. Cyril Bailey, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1947). 
12 See Judith Butler, “Gender Is Burning: Questions of Appropria-
tion and Subversion,” in Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 121–140. 
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“can be to obey: by applying only where obedience is not 
required, this kind of free speech is just the flip side of 
power, a kind of supplementary and enabling excess.”13 
But this is just a caution, for we will always need critique 
(Bady himself never stops critiquing14) and it has not, con-
tra Latour, “run out of steam.” As long as there exist 
asymmetrical power relations and the capitalist-neo-lib-
eral uptake-reification of everything, we will need critique, 
especially if, by “critique,” we mean speaking truth to 
power, from within its relations, in order to insist that power 
account for itself, that it be held accountable (which is also a 
way of putting particular checks on power, from a position 
of “equal standing” and in full view of some sort of “com-
mons”—at least, that’s the optimistic view15). But we have 
to be able to envision a possibility of change, for the uni-
versity, that might mean a new university that would be-
tray its own history, one that might even arrive from what 
Althusser termed “the assignable nothingness of all swerve,” 
situated in a no-place of aleatory encounter that Althusser 
imagined as being (if somewhat paradoxically) before his-
tory: 
 
In this ‘world’ without being or history (like Rous-
seau’s forest), what happens? . . . What happens 
there is what happens in Epicurus’s universal rain, 
prior to any world, any being and any reason as 
well as any cause. What happens is that there are 
encounters . . . . it is enough to know that it comes 
about ‘we know not where, we do not know when,’ 
and that it is the ‘smallest deviation possible,’ that 
is, the assignable nothingness of all swerve.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Aaron Bady, “Bartleby in the University of California: The Social 
Life of Disobedience,” The New Inquiry: Zunguzungu [weblog], 
May 3, 2013: http://thenewinquiry.com/blogs/zunguzungu/bart 
leby-in-the-university-of-california-the-social-life-of-disobedience/. 
14 Witnessed, for example, by Bady’s own stream of critical post-
ings on his blog zunguzungu at The New Inquiry: http://thenewin 
quiry.com/blogs/zunguzungu/. 
15 On this point, see Michel Foucault on parrhesia in Fearless 
Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001). 
16 Louis Althusser, “The Underground Current of the Materialism 
of the Encounter,” in Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encoun-
ter: Later Writings, 1978-1987, eds. Oliver Corpet and François 
Matheron, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), 191 
[163–207]. All subsequent quotations of this work cited parenthe-
8 The Future We Want 
	  
  Towards the end of his life, in the early 1980s, recently 
discharged from a psychiatric hospital in Paris, where he 
was hospitalized for three years after murdering his wife in 
1980, and living in a neighborhood apart from the École 
normale supérieure that had formerly provided a more 
socially sheltered existence (and thus, working more in 
the Outside), Althusser threw himself into a work never to 
be completed on the “materialism of the encounter,” 
which began simply, “It is raining. Let this book therefore 
be, before all else, a book about ordinary rain” (167). In 
this work, Althusser hoped to show that the most radical 
(and importantly, for him, anti-logocentric, anti-Meaning) 
philosophy of all would be one that takes account of the 
aleatory and the contingent as opposed to “necessity and 
teleology, that is to say, a . . . disguised form of idealism” 
(168).17 Philosophy, for Althusser, would then become a 
practice of observation and description of “crystallized” 
encounters, out of which the world would “open up” to 
us, as a sort of “gift,” “in the facticity of its contingency” 
(170). Philosophy would also dispense with the “problem” 
approach (i.e., “why is there something rather than noth-
ing?”) by “refusing to assign itself any ‘object’ whatsoever . 
. . in order to set out from nothing, and from the infinites-
imal, aleatory variation of nothing constituted by the 
swerve of the fall” (174–175).  
 This is not to say that one avoids history—after all, the 
world is filled with millions of somethings, as opposed to 
black voids, and history “gels at certain felicitous mo-
ments” (194)—for example, Althusser’s murder of his wife, 
which can never be undone18—but rather, in order for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
tically, by page number. 
17 But it should also be noted here that a logocentric critique 
isn’t—or in our view, shouldn’t be—scorn for creaturely attach-
ment to meaning-making as creative activity and meanings as 
creative productions. These are life-saving activities, after all, and 
key to thriving in this world. 
18 In a prologue to this unfinished book on “the materialism of the 
encounter,” Althusser wrote, “in November 1980, in the course of 
a severe, unforeseeable crisis that had left me in a state of mental 
confusion, I strangled my wife, the woman who was everything in 
the world to me and who loved me so much that, since living had 
become impossible for her, she wanted only to die. In my confu-
sion, not knowing what I was doing, I no doubt rendered her this 
‘service’: she did not defend herself against it, but died of it” 
(164). This strange and quasi-emotionally distant “confession” (if 
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anything different to happen (and that is an ethical pro-
ject, we would argue), one has to figure out strategies for 
creating special starting conditions that “void” (or at least 
temporarily “stay”) presupposed parameters of thought 
and movement and allow one to attend to the shock and 
materialism of the encounter. There would never be any 
“final” conclusions or certainties, just a Rousseauvian for-
est in which “the radical absence of society . . . constitutes 
the essence of any possible society” (184). Ultimately, for 
Althusser, the materialism of the encounter “is the mate-
rialism, not of a subject (be it God or the proletariat), but 
of a process, a process that has no subject, yet imposes on 
the subjects (individuals or others) which it dominates the 
order of its development, with no assignable end” (190). 
All possible arrangements and complementarities possess 
a certain “readiness” for possibility, in such a world of 
collision (190, 192), and Meaning (with a capital “M”) is no 
longer about origins or ends, but inheres instead in the 
felicity of encounter. 
 Let us work, then, to build a Rousseauvian forest, or 
Kaufmanesque swamp, in which we can practice our tini-
est deviations. We need, of course, our “arts of living,” 
which have a history (that we need not neglect) and which 
the traditional humanities has been so adept at cultivat-
ing, but this also means that the humanities is a reservoir 
of the sorts of creative delusions (and fuzzy thinking) that 
are necessary for not just surviving, but thriving. As the 
poet Lisa Robertson has written, “I need to be able to de-
lude myself, for as long as it takes, as long as it takes to 
translate an emotion, a grievance, a politics, an intoxica-
tion, to a site, an outside.”19 We need our delusional spac-
es. The University, and the humanities especially, is a space, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
it can be called such) is somehow more honest than the official 
confession Althusser wrote later in 1985, where he claimed he was 
only giving his wife a neck massage that somehow went awry and 
which induced in him a sort of hysterical amnesia (see Louis Al-
thusser, The Future Lasts Forever: A Memoir [New York: New 
Press, 1995]). We mention these biographical details because, in 
reading Althusser’s late writing on a “materialism of the encoun-
ter,” one can’t help but feel that his search for a philosophy of the 
radically empty, of the contingent encounter from which any-
thing was possible, was also somehow a search for his own void 
from which to begin, again. 
19 Lisa Robertson, “The Weather: A Report on Sincerity,” DC Poet-
ry (2001): http://www.dcpoetry.com/anthology/242. 
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we’ve stated above, for the artfulness of living, for enriched 
environments, and real-time experimental ecologies—
which is to say, for alternate delusions, and this means we 
also need an alternate delusion for the University.20 We’ve 
never liked the phrase, “what’s Plan B?” But honestly, 
what is Plan B? 
 Who will take over? You know what’s missing in Isa-
belle Stengers’s comment—“At the end of the era of the 
medieval university, it was not clear who would take 
over”? The what. Who’s going to take over what? The “dip-
lomatic institution” called a university, which is already 
dead, or maybe just a little ruined? A little ruination never 
hurt anyone. This world looks beautiful in the light of a 
ruined moon, in the dusk of the carbon dust of a ruined 
world. But it might look better in the hail of an Epicurean 
rain. And you know what that means? We need to go out-
side, where it’s raining. 
 Who’s going to take over what? How about if, when 
they get here, there’s nothing to take over? Because we 
dispersed, and went rogue-medieval-itinerant? We went 
out in the rain. We might decide, with Michael O’Rourke, 
to seek out “a recalibrated futurity for the humanities 
which recognizes that its future will always have been its 
end, which, more affirmatively put, is to say that its future 
will have been always to begin its ending again. . . . [and] 
we can find a certain dignity in what we are doing if we 
maintain absolute fidelity to the incalculable and unreck-
onable event of the university to-come, the university 
without condition.”21 This will also mean embracing what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 On the subject of the ways in which the university, and espe-
cially the humanities, have been undermined and how they might 
reclaim new space(s) among the “ruins,” as it were, see (among 
other works), L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Staying Alive: A Survival 
Manual for the Liberal Arts (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2013), and 
Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1997). On how the university has reached its current 
state of troubling affairs, see Christopher Newfield, Unmaking the 
Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle Class 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), and Benjamin 
Ginsberg, The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All-Admin-
istrative University and Why It Matters (Oxford, UK: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2011). 
21 Michael O’Rourke, “After,” In The Middle, November 29, 2010: 
http://www.inthemedievalmiddle.com/2010/11/guest-post-mich 
ael-orourke-after.html. This post is a transcript of O’Rourke’s 
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Geoffrey Bennington has written, by way of Derrida, about 
the institutionality of the university: 
 
The University . . . [has] a responsibility to foster 
events of thought that cannot fail to unsettle the 
University in its Idea of itself. . . . On this account, 
the University is in principle the institution that 
‘lives’ the precarious chance and ruin of the insti-
tution as its very institutionality.22  
 
So let’s affirm some ruinous possibility now—that means 
knowing your history, but also when to let go of it, and to 
be willing to remain perpetually unsettled, both in terms 
of knowledge disciplines, but also in terms of place, or as 
Simone Weil once put it, “we must take the feeling of be-
ing at home into exile. We must be rooted in the absence 
of place.”23 The university isn’t a place, it’s a state of mind. 
Wherever we are, wherever we gather, wherever we pro-
fess—that is the university, and there will never be a take-
over of that situation.  
 But we have to get out in the rain and also learn how to 
make it rain. We have to go outside and join hands with 
the ever-growing academic labor precariat and start form-
ing new initiatives for para-academic outstitutions.24 It’s a ques-
tion of the atmosphere, and how we need to be more 
drenched in it. And as Derrida wrote, “take your time, but 
be quick about it, because you do not know what awaits 
you.”25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
keynote address at the 1st biennial meeting of the BABEL Work-
ing Group held in Austin, Texas in November 2010. 
22  Geoffrey Bennington, “Foundations,” Textual Practice 21.2 
(2007): 231–249. 
23 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, ed. Gustave Thibon (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), 86. 
24 Here we are making a nod toward new educational (and occa-
sionally anti-institutional) and alt-cult initiatives and start-ups, 
such as the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research (http://the 
brooklyninstitute.com/), The Public School New York (http:// 
thepublicschool.org/nyc), continent. journal (http://www. conti-
nentcontinent.com/index.php/continent), punctum books (http: 
//punctumbooks.com), and The Bruce High Quality Foundation 
(http://www.thebrucehighqualityfoundation.com/), just to name 
a few. 
25 Jacques Derrida, “The Future of the Profession or the University 
Without Condition (thanks to the ‘Humanities,” what could take 
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place tomorrow),” in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Criti-
cal Reader, ed. Tom Cohen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, 2001), 24–57. 
